ABSTRACT
Introduction
The theoretical and practical challenges of designing a fiscal regime for the extraction of an exhaustible mineral resource have generated a substantial economics literature and considerable debate among policy makers, independent advisers, and resource producers. 1 The choice of instruments and their role in a fiscal regime are influenced potentially by many considerations whose relative importance varies with the particular circumstances of the resource and the jurisdiction in which it 1 See recent reviews by Boadway and Keen (2010) , Otto et al. (2006) , and Hogan and Goldsworthy (2010). is located. 2 A common feature of the design problem, however, is the desire to achieve an acceptable return for the resource owner-often a government on behalf of the public-in an economically efficient manner. In this regard, it is frequently argued that the optimal device is a profit sharing arrangement, and that quantity-based royalties (ad rem or ad valorem) should be avoided because they distort incentives and create inefficiencies.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that efficiency and optimality are relative to the objective specified. In the analyses that have led to the conclusion that royalties distort incentives, the typical goal is maximization of the expected net present value (profit) obtained from extraction, generally from the perspective of a single resource producer. 3 No weight is given to the impact of extraction on other measures of material concern to the owner, whether society or private individual. These analyses have been mainly concerned with intertemporal extraction profiles (the timing and quantity of resource extracted) when extraction is less than complete (see, e.g., Conrad and Hool 1985; Otto et al. 2006) , but have also addressed risk sharing when the value of a mining tract is uncertain (Leland 1978) . The introduction of a royalty alters the firm's efficiency (profit-maximizing) conditions and creates a tendency for the firm to extract the resource more rapidly and to shut down mining operations earlier, leaving otherwise valuable reserves in the ground. In this context, pure profit sharing provides a nondis-2 Boadway and Keen (2010) provide a comprehensive analysis.
3 A typical example is given by Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983) , where the objective function is simply maximization of the present value from extraction either from the perspective of the producer or without regard to ownership.
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These conclusions have led naturally to the advocacy of profit sharing schemes, among which resource rent taxes in particular have enjoyed some increased popularity, and a movement away from royalties in resource contracts. Advice by major international financial institutions also has placed emphasis on "rent" charges, while accepting the need for modest royalties despite their claimed disadvantages (IMF Fiscal Affairs 2012; Otto et al. 2006; Baunsgaard 2012 ). In addition, as noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF Fiscal Affairs 2012, Box 3), high-income countries, with the notable exception of the United States, have moved away from royalties and replaced them with income-based charges. In contrast to this trend, there are recent examples of countries (including Mongolia and Zambia) where royalty rates have been increased. 4 The debate about the merits of royalties relative to profits charges is empirically important because countries vary with respect to application. The differences result in part from the economic framework used to evaluate the policies and, as we have noted, the view that royalties are economically inefficient. These differences are seen in Table 1 , where relevant provisions for the issue at hand are summarized for some petroleum-producing countries. We note that all countries impose a standard profits tax that is generally applicable, perhaps at different rates, to all economic sectors. In our analysis of the roles of royalties (production-based charges) and income-based charges, we take as given the generally applicable profits tax regime. 5 The contrast is most starkly illustrated by comparing the United States (federal off-4 Mongolia introduced a surtax royalty with rates that vary by mineral, in 2011 (Ernst and Young 2012) . In 2013, Mongolia also increased the royalty on gold (InfoMongolia, www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/7348 [no longer available]). Zambia has increased the base royalty on copper to 6% (Conrad 2014) . 5 We note also that contractual form does not in itself have economic relevance for the outcome. For instance, a production sharing contract in its pure form is effectively a resource rent tax (profits-based charge) with a zero interest rate applied to the cash flow and is equivalent to such a charge imposed in a more traditional lease contract. See Alexeev and Conrad (2017). shore) and Canada (Alberta) with the United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway. 6 The United States and Canada (Alberta) employ production charges as a basis for computing the factor payment, while countries in the latter group have eliminated production-based royalties and substituted resource rent taxes or excess profits charges explicitly in lieu of royalties. The Australian system is the most clearly aligned with the Garnaut-Clunies Ross framework (see the Policy Transition Group [2010] study and the Report to the Treasurer [AFTS Secretariat 2009] on Australian tax reform), but it is clear that the United Kingdom, Indonesia, and Norway have replaced royalties with a type of profits-based charge in addition to the standard profits tax. These charges are limited exclusively to natural resource production and thus are further evidence of the natural resource basis of the charge.
The United States, on the other hand, has a standard flat rate ad valorem charge that corresponds to the historical and current treatment of factor payments in private ownership economies. In particular, private owners of reserves in the United States use royalties as do oil companies that retain an interest in operations where production is contracted to others. Such royalties paid to those who retain an interest are called overriding royalties. Property rights to reserves are vested in the Canadian provisions. Alberta's royalties, which are per unit and have rates that vary with both price and quantity, are evidence of property ownership, whereas the central government in Canada imposes no such charge, because the mineral rights are held by the Canadian provinces.
Other countries employ a combination of royalties and excess profits taxes (production sharing). Some countries use a sliding scale for royalties based on geological characteristics (e.g., Netherlands, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria), while others are flat rate (e.g., Azerbaijan). China's excess profits tax is really a production-based charge and thus should August 2018 Land Economics technically be regarded as similar to the one employed in Alberta.
The profits-based charge might be variable, based on either rates of return (e.g., Ghana) or net present value. In addition, a carried interest such as the one used in Ghana might be a type of profits charge, depending on the interest rate used to compute the carry.
Finally, the Iraqi system is based on a service contract arrangement. Under this regime, no royalty is charged because the producer is simply supplying a service and the government retains the rights to all production and sales. Thus, the efficiency issue in this case, as will be shown, is whether the government determines the extraction profile (implicitly using the shadow price to determine the extraction profile via internal prices). The contractor is then paid a service fee (like a law firm) in exchange for the services provided. Such a fee, however, has risk sharing characteristics in that the fee is based on the overall profitability of the property.
Given the variation in practice despite the widespread condemnation of royalties, it is important to revisit the question of efficient payment schemes. The practice of applying royalties might be more in accord with efficiency than either the advice to the contrary or the theory upon which that advice is based. In particular, we will demonstrate that there is an essential role for royalties in mineral extraction contracts. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the body of analysis referred First, we take account of the fact that the residual value of the property-the reserves and the surrounding land or sea-will typically not be zero even if the extraction of reserves becomes uneconomical within the contract period. Second, we view the determination of optimal mineral resource payments not as a taxation problem but as a contracting problem-specifically, a principal-agent problem where property rights are clearly defined and the objectives of the resource owner and the extracting firm are generally not aligned. 7 We argue that there are fundamental reasons to view the determination of the optimal resource payment structure from a perspective that differs from the maximization of economic rent from extraction, assuming the opportunity cost of extraction is zero. In other words, the discrediting of royalties has been based on analyses of the wrong formulation of the problem. When the government's objective is no longer congruent with the extracting firm's goal of private profit maximization, it will in general be necessary to align the firm's incentive in order to achieve the optimal outcome. It should be emphasized that while we are framing this problem in terms of a government as the owner of the resource (the principal), the fundamental issue is accounting properly for opportunity cost. Assuming private ownership would alter neither the nature of the argument nor its implications.
The principal-agent structure is a natural one in the present context because of the separation of ownership of reserves from the extraction decision, as well as the uncertainty, informational asymmetry, and limited observ- 7 The reason that firms contract with governments for extraction rights is the simple fact that the government holds the mineral rights. Otherwise, the contracting problem would be between private agents, as is the case in the United States, where mineral rights can be vested in private hands. It is important to note that the use of the principal-agent framework is not necessary to demonstrate the efficiency of the royalty. We show below that the royalty is the price that would otherwise be reflected in a market for reserves or as the opportunity cost of a productive factor in the case of efficient state ownership. ability that characterize mineral exploitation and need to be considered in optimal contract design. We begin by abstracting for the most part from these important features, in order to demonstrate that the argument for using royalties does not depend on the complexities arising from uncertainty and information issues. We show that even in conditions of certainty and complete information, it will generally be optimal to have a per unit charge imposed on extraction. Further, this royalty can (and should) be interpreted as the payment for a scarce factor of production: the price of reserves that will equilibrate supply and demand for the extractable resource and maximize the surplus available to be distributed to both parties to the contract. In this regard, the mineral reserves are no different from any productive input such as labor, and a royalty as the price of reserves is no different than a wage rate as the price of labor.
We then proceed to show that the presence of uncertainty, though complicating the analysis, does not fundamentally alter the nature of the problem. The form taken by the optimal royalty in this context is a generalization of the royalty in the case of certainty.
The demonstration here that royalties have a key role to play in resource extraction contracts is an argument based purely on economic incentives and efficiency. Other arguments for using royalties, pointing to practical considerations such as their relative ease of administration and concerns about transfer pricing and other measures to reduce accounting profits, reinforce the case for royalties but are excluded from the analysis.
Context
A number of potential factors underpin the formulation of the resource owner's problem proposed here. Broadly speaking, they relate to three fundamental concepts: property rights, rent, and opportunity cost.
Property Rights
Governments should not be regarded-or regard themselves-simply as tax collectors in the mineral production process. As the owner, on behalf of society, of the reserves of an exhaustible natural resource, a government owns the stock of a factor of production (reserves) from which a flow (extraction) is made possible. Reserves are an asset on the resource owner's (and society's) balance sheet. When mineral assets are held by the state, the value of reserves should be reflected on the state's balance sheet, just like assets used to produce other publicly provided goods and services such as mail delivery, highway services, and even steel and electricity, depending on the degree of state participation in the economy. The fact that the mineral reserves are a gift of nature and were thus free to the government does not alter this; nor does the fact that the mineral extracting firm may have acquired the rights, for some period, to extract the resource. Title to the stock of reserves is not transferred to the extracting firm when the reserves are held by the state. 8 The government owns the initial stock of reserves, and it owns the remaining stock-plus any residual value of the land or sea-after the lease expires. It is the quantity of the reserves being extracted that is being sold from the resource owner's inventory, as well as the lease rights to use the property (surface rights and other real property) for a specified time period. 9 The fact that extraction rights may be granted for a long period, and potentially be renewable, does not vitiate this point. If indeed this did amount to a de facto transfer of property rights, the firm should then internalize the shadow price of the reserves. 10 If there were an actual transfer of property rights, as permitted with private property in the United 8 In the United States, private property rights include the reserves. Consequently, any person holding land may transfer all of the land rights, including the reserves, and maintain no economic interest in the property. Alternatively, it is possible for owners to unbundle the property rights by selling surface (and related) rights, while retaining the mineral rights. 9 The use value of the entire deposit will generally not be zero for the investor. The use value, on a flow basis, includes extraction, pressure (in oil deposits), and the physical structure of the deposit.
10 If the resource producer internalizes the opportunity cost of reserves, then a royalty charged by the resource owner can still be efficient. The royalty can then be perceived as a transfer with no efficiency effects. For instance, a royalty that rises at the rate of interest in the original Hotelling model would equate to such a transfer (see Hotelling 1931) .
States, then the extracting firm would be able to dispose of the property and recover the value of its surface or subsurface rights after the closure of the mine. In this case, the opportunity cost would be fully taken into account as if a royalty had been imposed.
Rent
Consequently, except in instances where private property rights include mineral rights, it is the government that has claim to the resource rent, defined here as the return to the scarce productive factor. The resource rent will be capitalized into the price of the asset (the reserves and the land or sea that contains the reserves) and be reflected as an asset value on the government's balance sheet. The value of the combined asset base will be the maximum value of its use, which may or may not involve extracting reserves in the present or at any time in the future. 11
Opportunity Cost
The opportunity cost of using the resource (having reserves extracted by a particular firm at a particular time in a specified amount) might be determined by any of the following alternatives: (1) keeping the reserves in the ground; (2) using the surface rights for some other activity such as farming, housing, fishing, or other recreational or productive pursuits; (3) selling the reserves for the market price (lump sum) and not retaining any economic interest in the residual value of the property; 12 (4) leasing the reserves to a different firm; or (5) carrying out the resource extraction (renting the other factors of production) or entering into a service agreement with a mineral producer to carry out the extraction.
Governments have other reasons for being concerned with the consequences of extraction, including various economic and en- 11 The maximum present value of the property might be achieved by some means other than extraction. For instance, the present value of an oil tract might be $10 billion dollars, but the value of the tract for real estate development might be $15 billion if the tract is located in central Paris or midtown Manhattan.
12 Selling part of the country is generally not an option for a government, in contrast to private ownership.
vironmental effects-externalities-such as dislocation of the local population, Dutch disease, and environmental degradation. All of these are potentially significant but will not be distinguished explicitly in the current analysis.
Alternatives (1) and (2) have relevance at the margin because any benefit from increasing extraction today is reduced by the cost of forgoing the use of surface rights for some other economic activity or for extracting more reserves later. This view of the resource owner's position suggests an associated pricing issue for the reserves being extracted, related to the decline in value of the asset base relative to the opportunity cost of alternative uses. Prior to extraction, the resource stock has economic value, and, if extraction occurs, this economic value is diminished by use. Even after the cessation of extraction and closure of a mine, any residual reserves or surface rights are potentially valuable and may become economic for extraction, as has been the case historically either because of an increase in the value of the mineral (as output) or with lower extraction costs as a result of the application of new technologies (fracking being an obvious example). Some examples where mines have closed and later reopened are given in Table 2 . In many of these cases, the mine closed because prices were too low relative to costs, given the quality of the deposit, only to be reopened later when prices increased. Likewise, the land or sea in which the mineral is located is valuable, and this value may be reduced by extraction of the resource. It is the value of reserves and the scarce resources that contain those reserves that define the total value to any resource owner, government included.
Profit Sharing, Royalties, and Social Efficiency: The Case of Certainty and Complete Information
In this section, we begin the formal analysis by considering the benchmark situation in which there is no uncertainty and contracting parties have complete information. We demonstrate in this context the proposition that a profit sharing arrangement will generally not be sufficient to ensure that an optimal outcome for the owner will be implemented, and that to achieve this objective a royalty is required. The importance of the divergence between the incentives facing resource own- 
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Land Economics ers and producers, and the implications for decentralizing the optimal outcome, will be made clear. The subsequent introduction of uncertainty as well as incomplete and asymmetric information will generalize the results but will not alter the basic conclusion or affect the validity of the underlying principles. In this contracting situation, the principal is a resource owner (referred to now as the government) and the agent is a resource extracting firm. 13 The government evaluates the contract according to the payment it receives from the firm and its residual valuation of the property, including reserves, after extraction. The firm seeks to maximize its profit net of the payment made to the government. Extraction, if it occurs, is assumed to take place in a single period following the contract agreement. This simplifying reduction of a multiperiod decision to a single-period problem allows us to focus on the characterization of the contract rather than the optimal extraction profile.
As resource owner, the government chooses a payment function H(x) to maximize its utility function,
where R is the initial stock of reserves and x is the quantity of reserves extracted. The function ( ) R x ϕ − is the government's residual valuation of the property, which will take into account the value of remaining reserves as well as externalities such as the impact of extraction on the quality of the surrounding land or sea. For convenience, residual reserves R x − will be denoted by ∆. It will be assumed that the valuation falls as the quantity extracted rises, ( ) 0 and ( ) 0 ϕ ϕ ′ ⋅ ′ ⋅ ′ > < . The firm extracts a quantity (0 ), x x R ≤ ≤ which for simplicity will denote both the quantity of reserves extracted and also the quantity of the resource above ground (oil pumped from a well). The production cost C rises directly with this quantity and also indirectly through the loss of pressure, or increasing depth in the case of minerals, captured in the term ∆. ( , ) C x ∆ is assumed to be convex in 13 The model developed is in the tradition of Harris and Raviv (1979) , Hölmstrom (1979) , Mirrlees (1976 Mirrlees ( , 1999 , Laffont and Martimort (2009), and Shavell (1979) . C ⋅ ⋅ on input prices has been suppressed.
Given the payment function ( , ) H ⋅ ⋅ , the firm seeks to maximize its net profit:
If the government were able to act as the owner and operator of the firm, its payment would be equal to the profit, ( ) ( , ), H x px C x = − ∆ and it would choose x x =  such that 0.
On the other hand, if the firm chooses x = x*, then x* will satisfy the first-order condition 0.
If the government allows the profit-maximizing firm to operate in a decentralized fashion, subject only to the payment function ( , ) H ⋅ ⋅ , the firm will take account of the stock effect on the cost of extraction, but not-except indirectly through the payment ( , )
H ⋅ ⋅ -the residual stock value. This reflects the fact that the resource producer has no right to or interest in the residual value of the property once extraction ceases or the contract expires.
Comparing conditions [1] and [2], it is clear that * x x =  if and only if ( ) ( ).
H x ϕ ′ = ∆ ′ We can therefore state the following: Theorem 1. Suppose that x  is the government's optimal extraction level and x* is the firm's profit-maximizing extraction level when both the government and the extracting firm can observe or predict accurately the market price and the level of reserves. Then
if and only if the marginal payment by the firm is equal to the marginal value of residual reserves; that is, .
From Theorem 1 it follows that the optimal marginal payment x H ′ will be zero if and only if marginal extraction has no effect on the stock value. This is the first example of a recurrent theme: the argument for having a royalty as part of the optimal payment scheme is tied to the marginal impact of extraction on the residual value of the property. Unless this marginal impact is zero, a payment is required on a per unit basis. We return later to a consideration of the factors that will determine this outcome.
Suppose ( (1 ( ))( ) 0. . The profit-based payment has no impact at the margin and is unable to account for the effect of extraction on the residual valuation. The latter role is left to the royalty.
In the particular case where the payment ( , ) H ⋅ ⋅ is linear in the firm's revenue, its profit net of the royalty payment is
where ρ here is the royalty rate per unit of extraction, β is the fraction of net profit paid to the government (a Brown tax), and K is a lump-sum payment. Following the same analysis as before (see the Appendix for details), it is straightforward to show that the optimal royalty rate is the government's marginal valuation of reserves:
Theorem 2. Suppose that x  is the government's optimal extraction level and x* is the firm's profit maximizing extraction level when both the government and the extracting firm can observe or predict accurately the market price and the level of reserves. If the payment scheme is restricted to be a linear combination of an ad valorem royalty and a fixed profit share, then the extraction level will be optimal (
) if and only if the royalty rate is ( ) / . R x p ρ ϕ − ′ =  It follows trivially that the optimal royalty rate is zero if and only if ( ) 0 ϕ′ ∆ =; that is, at the margin there is no impact of extraction on the residual value of the remaining reserves and surroundings. So the value of ( ) ϕ ∆ , and more particularly its derivative ( ) ϕ′ ∆ , is of the essence in concluding whether there is a material justification for including royalties among the set of payment parameters.
The preceding analysis was focused on the incentives necessary for the firm to behave according to the government's preferences. In principle, if the government has full information and there is no uncertainty, then it can determine its optimal extraction profile, enforce it, and capture any surplus as a lump-sum payment. The enforcement could be achieved in a decentralized manner using a function that imposes an arbitrarily high payment for anything other than the desired quantity level.
However, governments rarely if ever dictate extraction profiles and do not use lumpsum systems exclusively. Instead, governments rely on price signals to indicate the marginal reduction in the value of the remaining reserves and the surrounding site. The royalty is that shadow price and will be nonzero if the reserves are scarce in an economic sense-which is not the same as physical exhaustion. 14
Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information
We now turn to situations in which there is uncertainty about one or more parameters and the government and mining firm are not equally informed. Clearly, there are many ways in which uncertainty and related informational asymmetries can enter the extraction decision and contracting problem. We focus on two sources: uncertainty about the quantity of reserves (R) in the mine, and uncertainty about the value (p) of the extracted product. In the first case we examine, the firm will know R, but the government will have only a belief characterized by a probability distribution over R. In the two remaining cases considered, the uncertainty and informational asymmetry regarding reserves will be compounded by price uncertainty, first for the government only and then for both the firm and the government.
In all cases, the government is tasked with framing a contract in which the payment by the firm comprises a nonlinear royalty payment ( ) ρ ⋅ , which is a function of the amount of ore extracted, and a nonlinear profit share payment ( ) β ⋅ , which is a function of the firm's profit net of the royalty payment. We assume that the royalty schedule is differentiable in extraction with derivative ρ′ and the profit share is differentiable in profit with derivative
The government's utility function is
Case A. Suppose the only uncertainty pertains to the government's knowledge of R.
Let the government's a priori information about R be described by the probability density function ( ) R f R . The government must choose the payment functions ( ) ρ ⋅ and ( ) β ⋅ before the firm makes its extraction decision. The firm's profit maximizing extraction level will be a function * * ; ( ), ( ) . ( ) x x R ρ β = ⋅ ⋅ The government is seeking to maximize expected utility:
The sequential timing of the problem can be characterized as follows:
Period 1. The firm discovers the actual amount of reserves.
Period 2. The government sets the contract terms based on maximizing its expected utility.
Period 3. The firm makes its extraction decision (as well as the market participation decision) based on the payment schedule set by the government and the amount of discovered reserves.
Period 4. The firm reports the reserves, profits, and extraction and pays the royalty and profit share to the extent applicable.
We can now establish the following result.
Theorem 3. Suppose that both the government and the extracting firm can observe or predict accurately the market price, but only the firm observes the level of reserves. If the government can charge the firm a nonlinear royalty and a nonlinear profit share, then the optimal payment schedules are as follows:
(1) Royalty:
where ( ) x R  is the efficient extraction level consistent with reserves R, satisfying
and R is a minimum quantity of reserves below which the resource owner will not allow any extraction. As in the perfect certainty case, the royalty depends on the marginal opportunity cost of depletion. The royalty amount may vary with extraction (or more specifically, with the level of reserves discovered). One special case is where the marginal reduction in the value of reserves is constant ( 0) ϕ′′ = over the relevant extraction range. In this case, the royalty would be constant. In other cases, the royalty payment will depend on cumulative extraction, and the per unit amount will vary for each level of extraction. In effect, the government, ex post, is able to price discriminate on a per unit basis and is able to capture the inframarginal value. The result also provides some support for the use of geological factors such as reserves or cumulative extraction in practice, for example, the royalties used in Netherlands, Nigeria, and Kazakhstan. The profit share is completely one sided in favor of the state. After reserves are determined, the government knows everything needed to extract the entire surplus from the producer and can do so efficiently with a simple fixed payment or service contract model.
We also see that the government may impose a minimum reserve requirement where reserves below the level specified will not be sufficient for the recovery of the fixed cost of devoting the reserves to extraction.
Case B. Suppose now that there is also uncertainty about the value of the extracted mineral when the government is determining the payment regime, but that subsequently the price is known to the firm when it makes its extraction decision. We assume that this price uncertainty is independent of uncertainty about reserves.
The sequential timing of decisions is similar to that described for the previous case where only reserves are uncertain for the government:
Period 1. The firm discovers the actual quantity of reserves and the market price of the resource.
Period 2. The government sets the contract terms based on maximizing expected utility.
Period 3. The firm makes the extraction decision (as well as the market participation decision) based on the payment schedule, price, and discovered reserves.
Period 4. The firm reports the price and discovered reserves to the government and pays the royalty and profit share to the government based on the contract terms.
In this case, the government is assumed to have independent probability distributions over R and p, with densities R f and p f . Provided that the profit maximizing extraction level is a function ( , ; ( ), ( ))
x x p R ρ β = ⋅ ⋅ , the government will want to choose payment schedules ( ) ρ ⋅ and ( ) β ⋅ to maximize expected utility:
The optimal royalty has the same general form as when the government is uncertain about reserves only. Once again, the government is able to discriminate in the sense that all inframarginal opportunity cost is recov-ered. The recovery of opportunity cost relative to the certainty case is not complete, however, because the government never knows the price and the inframarginal values now depend on the government's price distribution.
Profit sharing is again fully in favor of the government because it can force the firm to pay the full amount of reported ex post profit.
Case C. Suppose now, in addition to the government's uncertainty about the level of reserves and the price of the extracted mineral, the firm also is exposed to the price uncertainty and must make its extraction decision before the output price is revealed. We demonstrate that in this case the optimal payment schedule does not generally decompose into a profit share and the royalty: the royalty will be taken on the basis of the excess profit of the firm that is computed using the distribution of market prices. The timing of the new problem will be the following: Period 1. The firm discovers the actual amount of reserves.
Period 3. The firm makes the extraction decision (as well as the market participation decision) based on the contract with the government and the discovered reserves but without knowing the price.
Period 4. Price uncertainty is realized and the firm pays the royalty and profit share to the government based on the contract terms.
To identify clearly the source of uncertainty, we will use [ ] p E ⋅ to denote the expectation with respect to price uncertainty and [ ]
Rp
E ⋅ the expectation with respect to uncertainty about both price and reserves. We assume, to avoid further complication, that both the government and the firm hold common beliefs over prices.
The following result characterizes the structure of the optimal tax schedule:
Theorem 5. Suppose that the government must set the payment schedule while uncertain about both the stock of reserves and the mineral price, whereas the extracting firm can observe or predict accurately the level of reserves but not the market price of the resource when making its extraction decision. If the government can charge the firm a nonlinear royalty and a nonlinear profit share, then the optimal payment schedules are as follows:
and x is such that
The efficient royalty is now dependent on the marginal value of depletion adjusted for the covariance between price and the profit sharing rate. When profit sharing is such that the firm's relative share decreases with the profit, then the firm enjoys a lower marginal royalty. This reflects the fact that with both the government and the firm being uncertain about the prices, in order to ensure the participation of the firm, the government has to guarantee that the firm's profit does not fall below a certain threshold if the firm decides to extract.
Summary and Discussion
The results derived above reflect the perspective that natural resource stocks, like stocks of reproducible capital and labor, will accrue a nonzero shadow price if demand is sufficient to eliminate any excess supply in an economic sense. Physical exhaustion is not necessary for reserves to have a nonzero shadow price. As our analysis shows, this shadow price is the efficient royalty.
The analysis presented here for natural resource pricing is relevant in other contexts; the supposed inefficiency of sharecropping being an obvious example. The private sector institution of charging a fixed proportion of output for a land lease in agriculture has been criticized as inefficient since the time of Marshall, and a profit sharing scheme claimed to be more efficient. Of course, a profit sharing scheme is more efficient if the value of the marginal product of land is zero. If agricultural use decreases the fertility of land, however, and the residual land value falls as land is more intensively used, sharecropping will be an efficient solution. Sharecropping is only one possible application of the basic reasoning. An analogous argument provides a rationalization for compensating agents (such as actors or athletes) on a percentage of gross or proportion of sales basis.
In this paper, we do not argue that "economic rents," however defined, are zero or that a profit sharing scheme (or risk sharing scheme) is inefficient. Rather, a distinction needs to be drawn between economic rent and opportunity cost, both in total and at the margin. Some of the natural resource literature has placed emphasis on the nature of the rents that accrue because natural assets are gifts from nature (Garnaut and Clunies Ross 1983; IMF Fiscal Affairs 2012) . This emphasis has led to the view that certain pricing schemes, such as royalties, are inefficient. Our analysis demonstrates that such a claim is not valid in general. From an economic perspective, the positive value of an asset is not affected by how it was produced, whether by nature or by industry. Resource owners (the government, in most countries) must determine when, how much, in what order, and in what use to employ their natural resource stocks. These decisions are not costless even in a frictionless world where reserves can be extracted at different points in time and the land or ocean that contains those reserves has alternative uses. Equally important, economic exhaustion and physical exhaustion do not coincide by necessity. Economic exhaustion may occur within the time frame of one contract, leaving reserves for future extraction or land for alternative uses.
The approach adopted here takes account of the value of ownership and alternative use (through time and space) that implicitly has been assumed to be zero in previous analyses, leaving extraction decisions to producers who have no economic interest in the residual value of the reserves, the land, or the water after extraction is completed. Thus, asset values (liquidation values) at the end of extraction may be zero for the producer both in total and at the margin.
The fact that it might be counter to the producer's interest to extract reserves during any defined contract period does not mean that those reserves will not be extracted in the future, as illustrated in Table 2 . Alternatively, the opportunity cost of resource development for natural resource owners might be too high. Some landowners might prefer to use the land for other uses-for strictly monetary uses such as farming, environmental uses such as land set-asides, or the economic welfare benefits of maintaining the property.
If the marginal impact on residual value is not zero, then a price should be charged (or imputed, in the case where the extraction profile is controlled) and the resource owner should accrue that price as the return from ownership. If, however, the marginal impact is zero, then resources are in excess risk-adjusted supply forever and the resource owner should then receive zero, at least at the margin and perhaps in total. Reserves left in the ground have no value forever and it is not clear that even reserves extracted have any value at the margin.
Two policy implications stem from the results. First, an efficient natural resource contract may contain at least two payment types: a royalty to capture the impact on residual value and an income charge to capture rent. Whether such an income charge should be beyond the generally applicable income tax typically imposed by governments is outside the scope of the analysis. In principle, the resource owner can use the profit share component in the contract to extract all of the firm's surplus net of royalty payments. In practice, if there were in place a general income tax payable to the government, this would reduce the surplus available for extraction-whether the owner is a private entity or the government. If the latter, then to the extent that the aim of the income tax is to collect rent from all sectors, there may be no prima facie case for a special rent charge on natural resources. Second, the government might or might not have an ownership interest in natural resources, and there is at most a tenuous connection between efficient input pricing and taxes. The U.S. federal government, for example, does not enter into resource contracts when reserves are privately held. This highlights the fact that ownership, and in turn the preferences as well as the costs of resource owners, may affect the value of the marginal payments as well as the signal created by charging a positive royalty.
